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When there occurs a state of panic-a state which cannot
be foreseen or provided against by law-which cannot be
reasoned with, the government must assume a power to
prevent the consequence which may occur.
-Sir Robert Peel (1847)1
5.1 Introduction
The acceleration ofworld inflation during the 1970s along with the rise
in the rate of unemployment and the general instability of money and
prices have renewed interest in the operation of the gold standard.
Recent proposals for a return to some variant of the gold standard stem
from the belief that a return to such a standard will restore macroeco-
nomic stability. The belief is based on a casual look at history with the
consequentinference thatthe goldstandardcontributedto thestabilityof
the system. That view of price stability was supported by Keynes who
argued in Essays in Persuasion:
The course of events during the nineteenth century favoured such
ideas.... The remarkable feature ofthis long period was the relative
stability ofthe price level. Approximately the same level ofprice ruled
in or about the years 1826, 1841, 1855, 1862, 1867, 1871, and 1915.
Prices were also level in the years 1844, 1881, and 1914.... No
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wonderthatwe cameto believe in thestability ofmoneycontractsover
a long period. The metal gold might not possess all the theoretical
advantages of an artificially regulated standard, but it could not be
tampered with and had proved reliable in practice. (Keynes 1932, pp.
88-89)
Butanotherview ofthehistoryofthegold standardduringthe nineteenth
century reveals a succession of crises of varying length and depth. As
documented by Hyndman [1932] 1967, the nineteenth century in the
United Kingdom witnessed at least eight serious crises: in 1825,1836-39,
1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1882, and 1890. Given this perspectiveofthegold
standard era the relevant question should be not only how the gold
standard worked but also why did it fail.
The origins of the various crises during the gold standard era vary.
Some were "real" and some were "financial," some autonomous (like a
massive harvest failure), and some induced by mistaken policies. Of
course, no proponent of the gold standard has suggested that it would
eliminate harvest failures. The question, therefore, is whether and to
whatextentthepolicies thatareinducedby the rules ofthegamemitigate
orexacerbate the severityofcrises. Ourpaperexamines the 1847 crisis in
Great Britain. Thatyear, well documented by parliamentaryinquiries, is
of special interest because the origin of the crisis was "real." A harvest
failure gave rise to commercial distress and financial panic, the extremity
of which was remarkable. Our analysis examines the operation of the
gold standard, the policies ofthe Bank of England, as well as the speed
and extent of international adjustment in the form of gold and capital
flows.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief account of
the main events in the United Kingdom during 1847. Section 5.3 studies
theinstitutionalsettingofthegold standardandspells outaformal model
of the financial markets. The two crises of April and October 1847 are
studied in section 5.4. In section 5.5 we discuss whether suspension of
Peel's Act was necessary. The paper concludes with some observations
on the gold standard as a monetary system.
5.2 Outline of Events
The events of 1847 were initiated by a major harvest failure in Ireland
and England in 1846. The shortage ofdomestic food supplies led to large
price increases and trade deficits which in turn brought about an external
drainofbullionfrom theBankofEngland. Thesedevelopmentsoccurred
against the background of the "railway mania" which commenced in
1845. The railway mania along with the food shortage resulted in a
massive financial crisis, the analysis ofwhich is the subject ofthis paper.
The characteristics of the 1847 crisis were stated by John Stuart Mill:235 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
It is not, however, universally true that the contraction of credit,
characteristic of a commercial crisis, must have been preceded by an
extraordinary and irrational extension of it. There are other causes;
and one of the more recent crises, that of 1847, is an instance, having
been preceded by no particular extension ofcredit, and by no specula-
tions; except those in railway shares.... The crisis of 1847 belonged
to anotherclass ofmercantile phenomena. Thereoccasionally happens
a concurrence of circumstances tending to withdraw from the loan
market a considerable portion ofthe capital which usually supplies it.
Thesecircumstances, in the presentcase, weregreatforeign payments,
(occasioned by a high price of cotton and an unprecedented importa-
tion of food,) together with the continual demands on the circulating
capital of the country by railway calls and the loan transactions of
railways companies. . . . This combination of a fresh demand for
loans, with a curtailment ofthe capital disposable for them, raised the
rate of interest, and made it impossible to borrow except on the very
best security. Some firms ... stopped payment: their failure involved
more or less deeply many other firms which had trusted them; and, as
usual in such cases, the general distrust, commonly called a panic,
began to set in, and might have produced a destruction ofcredit equal
to that of 1825, had not circumstances which may almost be called
accidental, given to a very simple measure of the government (the
suspension of the Bank Charter Act of 1844) a fortunate power of
allaying panic, to which, when considered in itself, it had no sort ·of
claim. (Mill 1871, bk. 3, chap. 12, section 3)
Table 5.1 reports selected data for the period 1845-48. 1847 was
characterized by a deterioration in the balance oftrade and the terms of
trade as well as by a significant rise in the price of wheat and the other
price indexes.
The trade-balance deficit caused gold outflows and an accompanying
reduction in the supply of Bank of England liabilities and credit. While
Table 5.1 Selected Data for Great Britain, 1845-48
1845 1846 1847 1848
Exports 69.4 67.0 70.5 61.2
Imports 88.4 87.3 112.1 88.2
Trade balance -19.0 -20.3 -41.6 -27.0
Terms of trade 119.6 115.1 112.5 121.7
Price of wheat 50.8 54.7 70.0 50.5
Price of agricultural products 120.0 118.0 125.0 107.0
Price of industrial products 99.0 99.0 104.0 92.0
Source: All data are from Mitchell 1962.
Notes: The balance-of-payments data are measured in £ million; the terms of trade are an
index of the net barter terms (1880 = 100); the price of wheat is in shillings per imperial
quarter; and the prices of agricultural and industrial products are the Rousseaux price
indexes (1885 = 100).236 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
the external bullion drain was one direct consequence of the harvest
failure, a second one was the extensive commercial failures arising from
speculative forward purchases offoodstuffs for delivery in mid-1847. By
the time these contracts came to maturity, a good harvest for 1847 was
expected, and that change in expectations led to a drastic decline in spot
prices and default of many trading establishments. In addition, the pre-
carious financial position of many enterprises that had taken part in the
railway speculations reduced confidence in the financial integrity of the
system and resulted in an internal drain of bank reserves.
Figures 5.1-5.3 show the weekly data for the stock of bullion in the
BankofEngland, theBank'snote reserve, thestockofnotesheldoutside
the Bank, andthe price ofconsols (thesourcesofthe dataarelisted in the
Appendix).
T,wo majorcrises occurred during the year. The April crisis arose from
the reversal of Bank of England credit policy. Having followed to that
date a policy ofsterilization ofthe credit effect ofthe deficit by lowering
its reserve-deposit ratio, the Bank reversed its policy in April by raising
thediscount rateandonlysparingly accommodatingthediscountmarket.
Thesuddennessandseverityofthe actionledto apanicas the besthouses
in the trade found it impossible to obtain domestic credit.
The panic in October by contrast was due to an internal drain that
resulted from a loss of confidence in the convertibility of bank deposits
into Bank of England notes and was essentially due to the operation of
Peel's Act, which is described in the next section. That crisis was over-
come by the joint effect of a suspension of the prohibition of fiduciary
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Fig. 5.3 Price of 3 percent consols, 1847 weekly data.
policy led domestically to a full return of confidence and a reduction in
defensive liquidity positions while at the same time attracting gold and
capital from the rest of the world. By the end of the year the Bank of
England had restored its note reserve as well as its stock ofbullion to the
levels prevailing prior to the year ofcrisis. Both in April and in October
the timing of the public-sector-deposit withdrawals aggravated sig-
nificantly BankofEnglandliquidityproblems and contributedtoprecipi-
tating the crises.
The policies pursued to alleviate the October panic were an early
application of by now well-accepted central-banking principles. In the
subsequent section we develop an analytical framework to study the
interaction of external payments and the financial system.238 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
5.3 Institutions and a Model of Financial Markets
In what follows we discuss the events of1847 in the context ofa simple
model. The model establishes how the rate of interest is determined by
the existing stock of bullion, currency preferences of the public, and
reserve behavior of the Bank of England. The analysis starts with the
institutional setting, namely the provisions of Peel's Act of 1844.
5.3.1 The Provisions of Peel's Act and the Money Supply
Peel's Act, passed by Parliament in 1844, essentially enacted the
doctrine of the "currency school."2 The main provisions were the fol-
lowing:
1. The Bank was separated into Banking and Issue departments.
2. The fiduciary note issue was limited to fourteen million pounds
sterling, and the supplementary note issue required a lOa-percent mar-
ginal bullion reserve.
3. Notes were issued for bullion at 13.17s.9dpound sterling perounce
of gold.
The consolidated balance sheet ofthe Issue and Banking departments
is shown in table 5.2. Several points are worth noting. First, public
deposits, including in particular the Exchequer and the account for debt
service (entitled "For Payment of Dividends"), are distinguished from
private deposits that include bankers' accounts. Second, on the liability
side, the item "circulation" refers to Bank of England notes including
seven-day and otherbills. The latter remain less than one million pounds
throughout. Onthe asset side, the item "bullion" refers to silver andgold
bullion as well as coin in the Bank.
TostudytheBankofEngland as it operatedunderPeel'sAct, we show
in table 5.3 the corresponding disaggregated balance sheets ofthe Bank-
ing and Issue departments, respectively.
In analyzing the balance sheet two comments are relevant: First, the
Issue Department has security holdings in the amount of£14 million that
back the fiduciary component, (F), ofnote issue, (N), but at the margin
there is 100 percent backing of note issue. Furthermore, note issue is
confined to the Issue Department. Second, the Banking Department
holds part of the Bank of England note issue as reserve, (R), against its
deposit liabilities, (D + G).
The money supply-by which is meant here the supply of Bank of
England liabilities-equalsthe sum ofcurrency andprivate deposits, and
the monetary base equals the sum of currency and reserves. With these
definitions we expresstheproximatedeterminantsofthemoneysupplyin
equation (1):
(1) l+c M ==--[B + F] = m(c, r) [B + F] ,
c + ro.239 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847240 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
Table 5.3 Bank of England Disaggregated Balance Sheet













3As usual, we suppress the equity component in the balance sheet.
where m(c, r) = (1 + c)/(c + rex) is the money multiplier. The ratio of
total to private deposits is denoted by ex = (D + G)/D, c denotes the
currency-private-deposit ratio ofthe nonbank public, and r is the actual
reserve-total-deposit ratio of the Banking Department.
3 From equation
(1) it can be seen that an increase in bullion B, given the reserve- and
currency-deposit ratios, will increase the money stock as will a reduction
ofthe ratio oftotal to private deposits and ofthe reserve- and currency-
deposit ratios. Throughout this paper the discussion is confined to the
supply of Bank of England note and deposit liabilities.
5.3.2 The Financial Model
Thecurrency-depositratiois determinedbyinstitutionalfactors aswell
as by the reserve-deposit ratio. Specifically, a rise in the actual reserve-
deposit ratio, r, is assumed to enhance confidence in the convertibility of
deposits into notes (internal convertibility), and therefore it reduces the
desired currency-deposit ratio, c. This relation between c and r is ex-
pressed by equation (2):
(2) c = c(r), c' ~ o.
With this assumption the money-supply function (1) becomes:
(3) M=m(r)[B+F];m'~O.
where mer) =m(c(r), r).
Ourspecification impliesthat a rise in thereserve-depositratio exertstwo
effects on the money multiplier. First, the ratio reduces the multiplier
directly through the increased use ofhigh-powered money by the Bank-
ing Department; and second, the rise in the reserve-deposit ratio raises
confidence and thereby reduces the currency-deposit ratio, which in turn
increases the money multiplier. In what follows we assume that the net
effect of a higher reserve-deposit ratio is to lower the money multiplier,
that is, iii' < O. This may appear plausible at first sight but is in fact a
strong assumption since it eliminates the possibility of a dominating
impact of the internal convertibility problem.
The demand for real balances is assumed to dependon real income, y,241 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
as well as on the rate of interest, i, in the conventional way. Monetary
equilibrium requires that the real money stock, MIP, equals the demand
for real balances, L( ) as in equation (4):
(4) m(r)[B+F]IP=L(i,y); Li<O,Ly>O.
Focusingontheshortrunofweeksormonths ratherthan a yearormore,
we takebothprices andoutputas exogenoustothefinancial sector.
4With
this assumption and with a given fixed stock offiduciary issue, equation
(4) can be solved for the equilibrium interest rate as a function of the
reserve-deposit ratio and the stock of bullion:
(4') i = i(r, B; ... );
The adjustment of the Bank's lending policy, motivated by prudence
andprofit, is described inequation (5). TheBankingDepartmentadjusts
gradually, raising the reserve-deposit ratio through credit contraction, in
proportion to the discrepancy between the desired reserve-deposit ratio
<f> ( ) and the actual ratio, r. Thus,
(5) ;. = v[<f>(i) - r], <f>' < O.
Inequation (5) the desiredreserve-depositratio, <f>(i),declinesas therate
of interest increases. This decline reflects the behavior of the Banking
Department: in response to more profitable loan opportunities the de-
sired liquidity of the balance sheet is reduced.
A specification of the rate of inflow of bullion completes the mode}.
The rate ofinflow of bullion or the balance of payments, denoted by B,
depends on the exogenous trade balance as well as on the rate ofcapital
inflow. Capital flows respond positively to the international interest
differential, i - i*, and the foreign interest rate, i*, is taken as given:
(6) B=B(i-i*;... );Bi>O.
Again, we concentrate on the short term and therefore leave relative
prices and output as exogenous to the model.
5.3.3 Formal Dynamics
Equations (4'), (5), and (6) represent a dynamic model ofthe interac-
tion between the Banking Department's credit policy and the balance of




;= G(r, B); Gr<O, GB>O.
B= H(r, B); Hr > 0, HB < O.
where the signs of the partial derivatives follow from the previous
assumptions. Itis readilyverified thatthesystemshownin figure 5.4must
be stable.242 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
In figure 5.4 the r = 0 schedule shows the locus of reserve-deposit
ratios and levels of bullion at which the Banking Department is in
equilibrium with respect to its liquidity position. Therefore, along that
schedule the reserve-deposit ratio is neither rising nor falling. At points
above the schedule, the high reserve-deposit ratio implies a low real-
moneysupply and thus high interest rates. The preferredreserve-deposit
ratio is low, and therefore above ther = 0 schedule the reserve-deposit
ratio is being lowered. Conversely, below ther= 0 schedule, the Bank-
ing Department seeks to become more liquid because interest rates are
low, and ther~fore the reserve-deposit ratio is raised.
Along the B = 0 schedule the balance ofpayments is in equilibrium.
Points below and to the right of the schedule correspond to high money
supplies, low interest rates, capital outflows, and therefore deficits and
falling bullion. By contrast, points to the left ofthe sch~duleinvolve high
interestrates andgrowinglevelsofbullion. Alongthe B = 0schedule the
interest rate is compatible with external balance. The interest rate is
higher above and to the left ofthe schedule and lower below and to the
right ofthe schedule. Therelative slopes ofthe two schedules are implied
by the previously assumed restrictions.
As the arrows indicate, the dynamic model ofthe financial sector must
be stable and the approach to equilibrium cannot be oscillatory. From
any initial reserve-deposit ratio and stock of bullion, the adjustment
process leads to the steady state at point A where the Bank's liquidity
position is in equilibrium and external payments are balanced.
The response ofthe Bank's reserve-deposit ratio to the rate ofinterest
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Bank, the flatter the schedule; in the extreme, when the Bank is entirely
unresponsive, the desired reserve-deposit ratio is constant and ther= 0
schedule is horizontal. As the reserve-deposit ratio becomes more re-
sponsive, th~ schedule steepens until, in the limit, its slope coincides with
that of the B = 0 schedule. The responsiveness of the reserve-deposit
ratio, ofcourse, determines the extentto which interest rates move in the
adjustment process. If the reserve-deposit ratio declines in response to
high interest rates, then a shortage of bullion will in part be offset by
increased lending onthe partofthe Bankandinterest rates thereforewill
tend to be lower, the balance ofpayments will be smaller, and the rate of
adjustment will be slower. Conversely, if the reserve-deposit ratio is
unresponsive, a shortage of bullion implies a sharper reduction in the
money stock, high equilibrium interest rates, larger capital flows, and
faster adjustment.
5.3.4 The Adjustment Process
The traditional model ofthe price-specie-flow mechanism, originating
with David Hume, emphasizes the impact ofrelative prices on the trade
balance and hence on the balance ofpayments and the international flow
of bullion. A deterioration of the external balance due to increased
aggregate spending oran adverse development ofnet exports will leadto
bullion export, monetary deflation, declining spending, and price defla-
tion. Both the decline in spending and deflation work to restore external
balance.
Themodel we have sketchedhere, onthe contrary, places emphasison
capital flows and banking policy as the main factors in the adjustment
process. The two views of the adjustment mechanism are of course
complementary, although they may well correspond to different adjust-
ment periods. In the short run, banking policy and capital flows are likely
to be the main factors determining bullion flows, since, in the short run,
prices and trade flows do not adjust to the full, possible extent.
The role of capital flows in the adjustment process was recognized by
contemporaries. John Stuart Mill, in particular, noted:
It is a fact now beginning to be recognised, that the passage of the
preciousmetalsfrom countrytocountryis determinedmuchmore than
was formerly supposed, by the state of the loan market in different
countries, and much less by the state ofprices. (Mill I8?1, bk. 3, chap.
8, section 4)
In addition to the difference between the balance of trade and the
capital account in facilitating adjustment, there is another aspect of the
adjustment process that deserves emphasis. The traditional representa-
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adjustment. Bullion flows are matched one-for-one by changes in the
amount ofcurrency outstanding. This is, ofcourse, not the case once the
reactions ofthe Banking Department are taken into account. Changes in
the reserve-deposit ratio of the Banking Department affect the money
stock independently of the existing stock of bullion. The question then
arises whether during the 1847 episode the Banking Department's credit
policy might in fact have amounted to partial or even complete steriliza-
tion ofbullion flows. The possibility ofcredit expansion by the Bank and
ofloss ofnote reserves tofinance the exportofbullion is suggested by the
data which reveal a high correlation between weekly changes in bullion
and in note reserves.
Consider an autonomous, transitoryimprovementin the trade balance
which leads to an inflow of bullion and therefore to a monetary expan-
sion. The monetary expansion lowers the interest rate, and, with a
constant reserve-deposit ratio (or a flat; = 0 schedule in figure 5.4), the
lower interest rate leads to capital outflows and thereby to restoration of
the initial equilibrium. Now if, on the contrary, the reserve-deposit ratio
rises due to the Banking Department response to the reduced profitabil-
ity ofloans, then the rise in the reserve-deposit ratio dampens the decline
in interest rates and therefore slo.ws down the adjustment process. The
Banking Department's reaction to the interest rate will only slow the
speed of adjustment but will not eliminate the adjustment process. Thus
our model is also capable of incorporating a partial sterilization policy
with an effect of dampening interest-rate movements and reducing the
speed of adjustment.
Changes in the reserve-deposit ratio enter consideration in another
respect. If the Bank, perhaps in response to a loss of confidence on the
part of the public, decides to raise the reserve-deposit ratio, then this
raise, of course, leads to a reduction in the supply ofmoney and credit.
Interest rates rise and that state persists until bullion inflows accommo-
date the desired increase in reserves. The model suggests therefore that
changes in the Bank's reserve preferences may be an importantsource of
macroeconomic disturbance.
The possibility ofinternal inconvertibility turns outto be an important
issue in the 1847 crisis. Internal inconvertibility would arise if the Bank-
ing Department should become sufficiently illiquid not to be able to
redeem its deposit liabilities in notes. Thus there is a clear distinction
between external or gold convertibility and internal or note convertibil-
ity. Note convertibility involves the Banking Department's reserve-
deposit ratio. If the reserve-deposit ratio falls too low, the public loses
confidence and reacts by raising the currency-deposit ratio. While our
model embodies this reaction of the public, the reaction is for the mo-
ment not allowed to exercise a dominating influence.
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5.3.5 Some Evidence
Beforediscussing in detail the various crises thatoccurred during 1847,
we look at some evidence that is consistent with the general analytical
framework outlined in this section.
Thedynamicmodelwas summarizedbyequations(7) and (8). Changes
in the reserve-deposit ratio depend negatively on the level of that ratio
and positively on the stock of bullion, while changes in the stock of
bullion depend positively on the reserve-deposit ratio and negatively on
the stock ofbullion. In table 5.4 we report regressions ofthe changes in
the reserve-deposit ratio and bullion on the previous-weeklevels ofthese
variables. The coefficients have the predicted sign and are statistically
significant. We view these estimates as providing support for the analyti-
cal framework that was developed in this section, and we turn next to a
more detailed analysis of the crises of 1847.
5.4 Financial Markets and the Balance of Payments in 1847
5.4.1 The April Crisis
The harvest failure of 1846-47 depleted the bullion in the Bank in the
fall of 1846 and more so in early 1847. Table 5.5 shows the development
ofbullion, note reserves, the reserve-deposit ratio, thediscount rate, and
the stock ofnotes in the hands ofthe public during the first halfof1847.
The table brings out forcefully the magnitude of this depletion. Indeed,
over the period 2 January to 17 April 1847, bullion fell by about 40
percent and note reserves in the Banking Department declined by about
70 percent. Theextraordinarydeclinein thereserve-deposit ratiofrom 46
percent to 19.6 percent implies that the Bank sterilized substantially the
effect ofgold outflows. The decline in the reserve-deposit ratio occurred
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Notes: 't and Bt denote, respectively, reserve-deposit ratio and bullion in the Bank of
England; ~'t and ~Bt denote the weekly change in these variables. R
2 denotes the coef-
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along with an increasing discount rate. The table reports the weighted
average discount rate applied by the Bank. From a level of 3 percent at
the beginning ofthe year, the rate was gradually raised toward 5 percent
in early April 1847.
These developments suggest that part of the effects of the external
drain on the money supply were sterilized. Whether sterilization was a
conscious policy, or whether it was a banking response to increasing
interest rates and credit tightness, is open to question. But it is certainly
interesting to note that F. T. Baring, the ex-chancellor ofthe exchequer,
argued that the possibility ofsterilization was a major defect ofthe Bank
Act of 1844:
I believe, if we look back, we shall find that the operation of the
deposits and the question of reserve was not sufficiently considered,
either by those who were favourable orthose who were opposed to the
bill. I cannot find in the evidence before the committee of 1840 more
than a few sentences leading me to suppose that danger arising from
such a cause was contemplated or referred to; yet this was a most
important consideration; for it was by the reserve, the bank was
enabled to do what was contrary to the spirit ofthe bill when gold was
running out, not to reduce their circulation by a single pound. I do not
thinkthatthesystemworkssatisfactorilyin this respect; andin fact, the
pointdidnotreceive anythinglike a sufficientconsideration. Perhapsit
was impossible before the bill was in practical operationto see how the
reserve ofnotes would operate; but it certainly never entered into the
contemplation of anyone then considering the subject that £7,000,000
in gold should run off, yet that the notes in the hands of the public
would rather increase than diminish. (MacLeod 1896, pp. 141-42)
The relative constancy of notes in the hands of the public, to which
Baring refers, is shown in table 5.5. Through late April 1847, notes were
practically unchanging while bullion declined by nearly one-third. In this
period the Bank ofEngland expansion "financed" the export ofbullion.
Table 5.5 The April 1847 Crisis (million £)
Bullion Reserve- Notes in
Note in Issue Deposit Discount Public
Reserves Department Ratio (%) Rate (%) Hands
2 January 8.23 14.26 46.0 3.10 20.0
6 March 5.71 10.99 36.0 4.14 19.3
3 April 3.70 9.55 23.9 4.25 19.9
17 April 2.56 8.80 19.6 5.25 20.2
1 May 2.74 8.51 23.6 5.25 19.8
5 June 5.09 9.43 32.0 5.20 18.3
Sources: See table 5.2 and Appendix.247 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
Bullion losses did not exert their full contractionary effect on money and
credit because the reserve-deposit ratio was declining.
6
In March and April things became troublesome. The ongoing decline
ofbullion tightened credit-marketconditions, and the failure ofthe Bank
to change its accommodating stance in the face ofa deteriorating balance
sheetevokedconcernaboutasudden reversalofpoliciesthatwould leave
the public without notes and without loans. In April, therefore, the
ongoing drain of bullion was reinforced dramatically by the seasonal
payment of the dividend, which meant a significant run-down of public
deposits. During the week of17 April reserves fell to a level ofonly£2.56
million; the reserve-deposit ratio fell to less than 20 percent. Consol
prices fell in March-April by 4.5 percent and short-term interest rates
skyrocketedas the Bankmovedvigorously to restoreitsliquidityposition
by reduced discounts, consol sales, and high discount rates.
Figure 5.5 shows the series for private and public deposits. The figure
makes it clear that whatever influence the bullion drain had on the
liquidity position ofthe Bank, the sharp public-deposit withdrawal could
not but accentuate the problem. Table 5.6 shows that the public-sector-
depositwithdrawal ledonly partiallyto aloss ofnotereserves and thatthe
money stock (currency held by the public plus private deposits at the
Bank of England) did not change substantially. The table confirms that
the Bank of England managed to face the runoff by selling securities.
Figure 5.6shows the weekly series ofthe reserve-deposit ratio during the
year. The effects of the extraordinary loss of reserves (by 17 April) and
the reaction ofthe financial markets and the Bank ofEngland have been
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Fig. 5.5 Public and private deposits at the Bank of England (in mil-
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Table 5.6 Money, Public Deposits, and Note Reserves in the
April 1847 Crisis (million £)
Money Public Note Bul-
Stocka Deposits Reserves lionb
3 April 30.3 6.0 3.7 10.2
10 32.7 5.0 2.8 9.8
17 32.2 3.0 2.6 9.3
24 29.8 2.6 2.7 9.2
Sources: See table 5.2 and Appendix.
aNotes in the hands of the public plus private deposits at the Bank of England.

























Fig. 5.6 Reserve-total-deposit ratio, 1847 weekly data.
When, therefore, the public saw that the whole banking resources of
the bankwere reduced to £2,558,000, a complete panicseized boththe
public and the directors. The latter adopted severe measures to check
the demand for notes. The rate was not only raised to five percent, but
this was only applicable to bills having only a few days to run, and a
limit was placed upon the amount of bills discounted, however good
they might be. Merchants who had received loans were called upon to
repay them without being permittedto renew them. Duringsome days
it was impossible to get bills discounted at all. These measures were
effectual in stopping the efflux of bullion; and a sum of £100,000 in
sovereigns, which had been actually shipped for America, was re-
landed. During this period the rate ofdiscount for the best bills rose to
nine, ten and twelve percent.
The tightening ofcredit led to internal dishoarding and to some reflow
ofbullion. Accordingly, the Bank's reserve-deposit ratio quickly rose to
about 30 percent. The crisis was overcome and the adjustment process of249 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
tight money was underway. The external part ofthat adjustment process
involved importationofbullion andforeign investmentin Londonas well
as English borrowing abroad. In response to high yields on consols, the
emperor of Russia decided to substitute foreign securities for gold as
backing for the Russian currency and made substantial purchases of
consols. These developments and their effect on the restoration of con-
fidence were described by a contemporary as follows:
Between the 25th and 28th of April confidence in a slight degree
revived. The Bank was then discounting more freely; and the impor-
tant news was announced that the Emperor of Russia had issued a
Ukase "orderinganinvestmentofaboutfour and a halfmillion sterling
in home and foreign securities." Under the impression that a large
amount ofthe money would find employment in Consols, as ultimately
was the case, this circumstance, coupled with greaterdisposition ofthe
Bank to grant facilities for accommodation, tended to abate the pres-
sure. (Evans 1849, p. 62)
It seems fairly clear from the events that the Bank's policy in the first
halfofthe yearwas certainlypoor. Ithadall thecharacteristicsofa policy
of"toolate, and (therefore)toovigorously." Thecontinuedexpansionof
credit in the face offalling reserves and the prospect offurther decline in
bullion meant that a crunch was quite inevitable. To wait too long before
tightening, and ultimately to administer it with severity, led to an unne-
cessary panic in the money market.
5.4.2 The October Crisis
The severe credit tightening following the April crisis restored the
Bank'sability to maintain convertibility. Table5.7shows thatbyJunethe
reserve-deposit ratio was again substantial. Currency outstanding was
significantly lower than during the April crisis. But during the late sum-
mer, and especially in earlyfall, conditions deteriorated, settingthe basis
for the October crisis.
Table 5.7 The October 1847 Crisis (million £)
Notes
Bullion Reserve- in
Note in Issue Deposit Discount Public
Reserves Department Ratio (%) Rate (%) Hands
5 June 5.09 9.43 32.0 5.2 18.3
4 September 4.19 8.40 28.9 5.9 18.2
23 October 1.55 7.87 11.6 8.1 20.3
24 December 7.79 11.61 44.5 5.7 17.8
Sources: See table 5.2 and Appendix.250 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
The credit tightening starting with the April crisis raised the cost of
credit substantially above what it had been in past years, and indeed
above anything the public could remember. This raise is the burden of
"ThePetitionofMerchants, Bankers, andTradersofLondon against the
Bank Charter Act"issued in July 1847, in which the opening statement
reads: "That there has lately been apparent throughout the commercial
and manufacturing community of this country an extent of monetary
pressure, such as is without precedent in the memory ofthe oldest living
merchant" (Gregory 1929, 2: p. 3).
Figure 5.7 confirms that 1847 interest rates were at a peak relative to
the preceding twenty-five years. In May, first-class bills had been dis-
counted at an all-time high of7 percent, but by July the rate had in fact
returned to 5.5 percent which, as the figure shows, was still very high.
By Octoberthe increasing tightness ofcredit, the extraordinaryheight
of the rate of interest, commercial failures, and the threat of default by
financial institutions had increased even further. Sir Charles Wood, the
chancellor of the exchequer, is quoted as stating:
Whenhe came totown in Octoberhe found the Cityin a stateofpanic.
He saw persons ofall classes and descriptions from the time he was up
until he went to bed, and he never passed so painful a week. The
interestofmoney rose to anexorbitantrate, and60 percentperannum
was charged for what were called "continuations" for one day. It was
thought impossible that the loans could be repaid. (Gregory 1929, 2:
p. 11)
Developments between June and September resulted in some decline in
both bullion and note reserves. The large payments for grain shipments
received in June and July from Russia became due and caused a further
drain ofbullion and reserves. By now, ofcourse, the cumulative external
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Fig. 5.7 Rateofdiscountonfirst-class bills, 1824-48(percentperyear).
Source: United Kingdom, Parliament 1848a, app. C, p. 467.251 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
and Banking departments still remained at a comfortable £8.3 million,
but note reserves were down to only £1.55 million, well within the
possibility of depletion by a scramble for currency. The same point is
evident from the reserve-deposit ratio that had declined from 32 percent
in June to only 11.6 percent by late October.
In the October crisis, once again, public-sector-deposit movements
played a role, but this time in combination with a scramble for currency
by the public. Table 5.8 shows a large decline in public-sector deposits of
nearly £4 million between 9 and 16 October. Three-quarters of that
deposit reduction is matched by a reduction in Exchequer bills on the
asset side. Inthe weekof23 October, dividend paymentsfurther reduced
public-sectordeposits andshowedupin increasedcurrencyin circulation.
The increase in currency during the first three weeks was only £2 million
and as such did not appear large, but that gain must be compared to note
reservesin theIssue Departmentwhich by the23rdhadfallen to only£1.5
million. The crisis thus involved potential minor increases in currency
holdings reducing the Bank to insolvency.
While the external drain set the preconditions for the crisis, it was the
internal run andscramblefor currencyshown in figure 5.8 thatcausedthe
panic of October. The poor liquidity position of the Bank deteriorated
further as a result of commercial failures. These caused the public to
question the soundness ofprivate banks and thus required, on the banks'
part, increased liquidity to demonstrate convertibility of their liabilities
into Bank ofEngland notes or specie. Again this factor exacerbated the
shortage ofBankofEngland notes and the inadequacy ofnote reserves.?
It is not certain who broke the Old Lady's back. There is some indica-
tion in the inquiry that private bankers threatened the withdrawal of
deposits from the Bank in excess ofthe amount ofnotes on hand (Greg-
ory 1929, 2: p. 113).8 The Bank, however, put up an admirable stone face
and would claim in the inquiry that convertibility was never in question.







The Bank in October 1847 (million £)
Public Private Circu- Exchequer
b Bul-
Deposits Deposits lationa Bills lion
c
9.4 7.7 19.5 3.9 8.4
5.5 8.7 20.3 0.8 8.4
4.8 8.6 21.3 0.7 8.3
4.7 8.9 21.8 1.2 8.4
Sources: See table 5.2 and Appendix.
aIncluding seven-day bills.
bHeld by the Banking Department.
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Private deposits and currency.
The Questionwas putto me overandoveragain whetherwe were able
to take care ofthe Bank. I always stated that, so far as the Bank itself
was concerned, we had no Difficulty; but that, whether Her Majesty's
Government might have any political Reasons, such as Fear of Mills
being stopped, or Riots in the Country, was a Question for them to
decide, and one which we could not answer. (Gregory 1929, 2: p. 11)
Indeed, the way the Bank proposed to restore its financial position
suggests thatit might well have beenable to maintain convertibility by an
extraordinary contraction of credit. Here it is worth quoting what the
governor told the House of Lords:
We should have had no Difficulty whatever in meeting all our Liabili-
ties. We should not have been able to give the same Extent ofAccom-
modation that Parties were requiring from us. Parties came and
thoughttheyhadonlyto ask for Money andtheywould have it aton,ce.
We might have putinto the Account a considerable Amount by selling
Consols. We had going offweekly Bills to the Extentof£1,500,000, so
that by discounting even at the Rate of £100,000 a Day to give the
Publicsome AccommodationourReservewouldstill have increasedat
the Rateof£900,000 a Week. Itis certainthatin averyshortPeriodwe
should have had as large a Reserve as would be necessary for our
Purposes, and therefore I maintain that the Bank was never at any
Period in Jeopardy. (Evans 1849, p. 89)
Whether the Bank might have been successful or not, the contraction
ofmoney andcreditwas so severe, commercialfailure was so widespread
and reaching increasingly the banking system, the government felt it was
wise to suspend Peel's Act, authorizing the Bank to issue notes without
gold backing. The letter of instruction, dated 25 October 1847, is given
below (the letter is reproduced in Turner 1897, pp. 159-60 and in Evans
1849, p. 87).253 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
Downing Street, Oct. 25th, 1847.
GENTLEMEN,-Her Majesty's Government have seen with the
deepest regret the pressure which has existed for some weeks upon the
commercial interests of the country, and that this pressure has been
aggravated by a want ofthat confidence which is necessary for carrying
on the ordinary dealings of trade.
They have been in hopes that the check given to dealings of a
speculative character, the transfer ofcapital from other countries, the
influx of bullion, and a feeling which the knowledge of these circum-
stances might have beenexpectedto produce, would have removed the
prevailing distrust.
Theywere encouragedin this expectation by the speedycessation of
a similar state of feeling in the month of April last.
These hopes have, however, been disappointed, and Her Majesty's
Government have come to the conclusion that the time has arrived
when they ought to attempt, by some extraordinary and temporary
measure, to restore confidence to the mercantile and manufacturing
community.
For this purpose, they recommend to the directors of the Bank of
England in the present emergency to enlarge the amount of their
discounts and advances upon approved security; but that in order to
retain this operation within reasonable limits a high rate of interest
should be charged.
In present circumstances they would suggest that the rate ofinterest
should not. be less than 8 per cent.
Ifthis courseshouldleadto anyinfringementoftheexistinglaw, Her
Majesty'sGovernmentwill bepreparedtoproposeto Parliamentonits
meeting a Bill of Indemnity. They· will rely upon the discretion ofthe
directors to reduce as soon as possible the amount oftheir notes if any
extraordinary issue should take place within the limits prescribed by
law.
Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any extra profit
derived from this measure should be carried to the account of the
public, but the precise mode ofdoing so must be left to future arrange-
ment.
Her Majesty's Government are not insensible of the evil of any
departure from the law which has placed the currency of this country
upon a sound basis; but they feel confident that, in the present cir-
cumstances, the measure which they have proposed may be safely
adopted, and at the same time the main provisions ofthat law, and the
vital principle ofpreserving the convertibility ofthe bank-note may be
firmly maintained.
We have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your obedient, humble Servants,
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.
CHARLES WOOD.
The Governor and Deputy Governor
of the Bank of England.(9)
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The authorization for fiduciary issue, coupled with the high discount
that the Bank was charging, rapidly restored financial stability. The
removal of the restriction of fiat-money issue dissipated the concern for
the internal convertibility of deposits into notes. High interest rates, at
the same time, brought about very substantial inflows of capital. The
capital inflows, in turn, expanded the bullion in the Bank and thus led to
internal monetary expansion that over time alleviated the extreme tight-
ness in credit markets. By 24 December 1847, the reserve-deposit ratio
had risen substantially while interest rates had declined from their panic
peaks of late October.
Itis important to recognize the role ofinternationalcapital flows in the
adjustment process. A key aspect, in the eyes of the government, was
that suspension of Peel's Act be implemented in a manner in no way
prejudicial to external convertibility, as it would be if fiat-money issue
financed export of bullion. To prevent such a course of events, a high
interestratewas anessentialpartofthesuspensionofPeel'sActsincethe
very size ofthe international interest differential would ensure that gold
importswere advantageous. Theywouldinturnprovideanexternal basis
for domestic monetary expansion.
The 1847 episodewas probablyresponsible for thepopularmaxim that
"7 percent will draw gold from the moon."9 That high interest rates do
attract gold flows is immediately obvious from the bullion gain. Between
Octoberand Decemberthe Bank'sholdings ofbullion rose by more than
50 percent. The interest responsiveness of bullion flows is substantiated
by a regression oftheflow ofbullion onlagged interestrates. Toexamine
theinterestresponsivenessofbullionflows we regressedthechangeinthe
stock of bullion on current and lagged values ofthe consol yield (up to a
lag of eight weeks). We experimented with various lag structures and,
consistently, the only significant coefficients were on the fourth and the
seventhlag. Equation (9) reportsthe regressionofgoldflows onthefour-
and seven-week lagged interest rate; standard errors are reported below
the coefficients:
Ji.Bt = - 0.892(107) + 0.179(10
9)it _ 4 + 0.795(10




R2 =0.75, D.W. =2.16, p=0.43.
The results are consistent with the expectation that the rate ofcapital
inflow is related positively to the domestic rate of interest. Since in the
pretelegraph period information on interest differentials could not be
transmitted instantaneously, itis reasonable thatgold flows responded to
lagged values of interest rates. The length of the lag, in turn, should
correspond to the length of time needed for a round trip between the
homecountryandits tradingpartners. Theroundtripwasnecessarysince
the information on rates of interest had to be transmitted and then the255 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
gold had to be shipped. The four- and seven-week lags that are reported
in equation (9) correspond, respectively, to the length of time of the
round trip between London and New York and London and St.
Petersburg.
tO If this interpretation of the lag structure is correct, one
might expectthatin subsequentperiods, following theintroductionofthe
telegraph, the lag structurewould be shortenedby a factor of50 percent.
What the regression bears out is also quite clear from contemporary
accounts-eapital did move in response to interest rates.
The season was advanced and the navigation on the Baltic near its
close; but even at the disadvantage of a double rate of insurance,
orders had been sent to St. Petersburg, under the impulse of an 8
percent rate ofinterest, which sufficed to bring backall, andmorethan
all the gold which had been exported in the beginning of the year.
(Hubbard 1848, p. 23)
That same principle was understood by the Bank of England.
It was desirable that capital and bullion should be attracted to this
country, and it was only by the attraction ofa high rate ofinterest that
this desideratum could be accomplished. He [the chancellor of the
exchequer] was convinced, therefore, that the mode in which the
Government had acted was the one best calculated to attain the end
they had in view-namely, the influx ofcapital and the importation of
bullion, and thereby the removal of the panic. (Evans 1849, p. 98)
Itis relevant to notein thecontextofthe discussion ofcapitalflows that
in the case ofa transitory real disturbance, such as a harvest failure, the
correct response is indeed financing through the capital account of the
balance of payments as opposed to the price-specie-flow mechanism of
adjustment which operates through the trade account. The 1847 episode
illustrates that principle.
5.5 Was the Suspension of Peel's Act Necessary?
The authorization for uncovered note issue, as we already mentioned,
immediately removed the panic, so much so that there was almost no
need to actually issue uncovered notes. In fact during the period of
suspension the Bank issued only £400,000 in notes in excess ofthe limits
set by the Act of 1844. The rapid restoration of confidence and the
normalizationofaffairs allowedthegovernmenttorevoke the suspension
on 23 November (reprinted from Evans 1849, p. 102):
Downing Street, Nov. 23, 1847.
GENTLEMEN,-Her Majesty's Government have watched with the
deepest interest the gradual revival of confidence in the commercial
classes of the country.
They have the satisfaction of believing that the course adopted by256 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
the Bank of England on their recommendation has contributed to
produce this result, whilst it has led to no infringement of the law.
It appears from the accounts which you have transmitted to us, that
the reserve of the Bank of England has been for some time steadily
increasing, and now amounts to £5,000,000. This increase has in great
measure arisen from the return of notes and coin from the country.
The bullion exceeds £10,000,000, and the state of the exchanges
promise a further influx of the precious metals.
The knowledge of these facts by the public is calculated to inspire
still further confidence.
In these circumstances it appears to her Majesty's Governmentthat
thepurposeswhich theyhadin view in theletterwhich we addressedto
you on the 25th of October has been fully answered, and that it is
unnecessary to continue that letter any longer in force.
We have the honour to be, Gentlemen,




The Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England.
The rapid normalization led in some quarters (in the Bank and else-
where) to the beliefthat there had been no real reason for the panic and
no need to suspend Peel's Act. Thus Hubbard (1848, p. 25) commented:
How utterly baseless were the apprehensions of the panic-mongers is
nowprovedby thefact thattheBanknotonlyneveravailed itselfofthe
power of additional issue, but met from its own resources all the
demands made upon it, including the extraordinary applications which
would naturally be encouraged by the prospect of their being favour-
ably received.
Of course, the statement reflects, in an exemplary way, the lack of
understandingofan internalconvertibilitycrisis. A convertibilitycrisis or
run occurs onlyifin fact noteverybodycan bepaid off. Suspension ofthe
act removed any conceivable basis for panic and therefore immediately
restored a measure of financial stability.
The special characteristics of an internal drain and the remedies that
are called for were fully perceived by Bagehot ([1873] 1962):
A domestic drain is very different. Such a drain arises from a distur-
bance ofcreditwithin thecountry, andthe difficulty ofdealingwith it is
the greater, because it is often caused, or at least often enhanced, by a
foreign drain.... What then ought to be done? In opposition to what
be at first sight supposed, the best way for the bank ... to deal with a
drain arising from internal discredit, is to lend freely. (P. 23)
Since the key issue underlying an internal drain is lack ofconfidence, it is
clear that257 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
what is wanted and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse the
impression, thatthough money may be dear, still moneyis to be had. If
people could bereally convinced that they could have money . . . they
would cease to run in such a mad way for money. Eithershutthe Bank
at once . . . orlend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you
mean to go on lending. (P. 31)
Chancellor ofthe Exchequer Sir Charles Wood told the committee of
inquiry that the basis of the panic was indeed a lack of confidence in
internal convertibility. He quotes commercial traders and bankers as
stating:
We do not want notes-what we desire is that you should give us
confidence, it is only for you to say that you will stand by us, and
nothingin theworld elsewill give us confidence. We do notwant notes,
but only to know where we can get them.... Charge 10 or 12 percent
interest ifyoulike-we do not mean to take notes, butlet us know that
at some rate of interest we can get them and that will amply suffice.
(Evans 1849, p. 96)
Sir Robert Peel for his part expressed the view that the Bank Charter
Act had failed in one important respect, namely, it failed to secure a
gradual and early, as opposed to severe and sudden, adjustment:
Ifthe Bankhad possessed the resolution to meet the coming danger by
a contraction ofits issue, by raising the rate ofdiscount . . .ifthey had
been firm and determined in the adopting of those precautions, the
necessity ofextrinsic interference might have beenprevented, it might
nothave been necessary for the Governmentto authorisethe violation
of the Act of 1844. (Andreades 1924, p. 339)
Many felt that the act, as opposed to Bank of England policy, had no
effect in aggravating the crisis. S. J. Loyd, for example, stated to the
committee that
the Act had no effect whatever in aggravating the Pressure. It pro-
tected the Public from the additional evil, which would otherwise have
occurred, of a Failure in maintaining Convertibility of the Notes, and
the consequentcomplete DestructionofourMonetarySystem. (Greg-
ory 1929, 2: p. 44)
But this view was not how the House ofLords came to see it. While also
agreeing on the fundamental importance of external convertibility, the
committee concluded that
the recent panic was materially aggravated by the operation of that
statute, and by the proceedings of the Bank itself. This effect may be
traced, directly, to the Act of 1844, in the legislative restriction im-
posed on the means of accommodation, whilst a large amount of
bullion was held in the coffers of the Bank, and during a time of258 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
favourable exchanges; and it may be traced to the same cause, indi-
rectly, as a consequence of great fluctuations in the rate of discount,
and ofcapital previously advancedat an unusually low rate ofinterest.
This course the Bank would hardly have felt itself justified in taking,
had not an impression existed that, by the separation ofthe issue and
the banking departments, one inflexible rule for regulating the Bank
issues had been substituted by law in place of the discretion formerly
vested in the Bank. (Turner 1897, pp. 162-63)
Likewise,
the Committee are fully aware that Alternations of Periods of Com-
mercial Excitement and of Discredit, of Speculation and of Collapse,
are likely to arise under all Systems ofCurrency; it would be visionary
to imagine that they could be averted altogether, even if the Circula-
tion were exclusively Metallic. But it is on this Account that greater
Care should be taken to avoid increasing an Evil, perhaps inevitable,
by any arbitrary and artificial Enactments.
TheCommitteeareofopinion, thatthePrincipleonwhich theActof
1844 should be amended is the Introductionofa discretionary relaxing
Power; such Power, in whomsoevervested, to beexercisedonlyduring
the Existence of a favourable Foreign Exchange. (Gregory 1929,
2: p. 40)
The very interesting aspect ofthe House ofLords' recommendation is
the link between fiat issue and the state of the foreign exchanges. It
represents a departure from strict gold standard rules where only actual
gold flows can be monetized. Under the proposal of the committee it is
enough to have the conditions for gold flows to take place, as opposed to
actual arrival ofgold, for suspension to be allowed. Thereis moneyissue,
so to speak, on credit. The compromise oflending freely at high rates-
the high ratesensuringin time the arrival ofgold andthevalidation ofthe
fiat issue-is important in that it is a remedy specifically for internal
convertibility crises for which Peel's Act had made no allowance.
The model ofthe gold standard developed in section 5.3 above did not
make provision for issues of stability and crisis. Portfolio adjustment by
the Bank and gold flows in response to interest differentials brought
about smooth adjustment. How can the panic of October be accommo-
dated in such a framework? Here it becomes essential to recognize the
dominating effect of the currency-deposit ratio. When the reserve-
deposit ratio ofthe Bank is sufficiently low so as to reduce confidence in
the viability of internal convertibility, then further reduction in the
reserve-deposit ratio may bring about changes in the currency-deposit
ratio so large as actually to reduce the money multiplier and the money
stock.
In terms ofequation (3), the money multiplier, in that low reserve-de-
posit-ratio region, responds positively to an increase in the reserve-o
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deposit ratio, and therefore the equilibrium interest rate responds nega-
tively. The sign reversal implies the possibility of multiple equilibria as
shown in figure 5.9. Point A' is the stable equilibrium studied earlier;
pointA is anotherequilibriumin theregionwhereconvertibility concerns
dominate the money-supply process. Point A is an unstable equilibrium
thatcan be attainedonlyfor initial conditions onthe GGschedule. Initial
conditions below and to the left of GG lead to unstable paths of the
reserve ratio thatdecline to zero. Fromapointsuch as C, withlow bullion
andlow reserves, the Banklowers the reserve-deposit ratio while bullion
is rising. The reserve-deposit ratio keeps falling, the currency-deposit
ratio keeps rising, and the system must collapse.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examined the operation of the gold standard and the
performance of the Bank of England during the crisis of 1847. The key
feature ofthat crisis was its origin: it began with the instability ofthe real
sector rather than from monetary disorder. That crisis highlights the role
ofconfidence in bothexternalandinternalconvertibility. Wepresenteda
simple model thatseems to capturethe centralcharacteristicsofthe crisis
and that emphasizes the role of international capital flows during the
adjustment process. Our analysis suggests that the suspension of Peel's
Act, i.e., the collapse of the rigid rules of the gold standard, was the
correctandtheessentialpolicyrequiredfor therestorationofconfidence.
We return now to the more general question ofthe gold standard as a






Fig. 5.9 Financial model-the unstable case.260 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
factorily, would have to satisfy three criteria: (1) assure stability and
predictability of the general level of prices and output; (2) separate
banking and financial problems, to a large extent, from the macroecon-
omy; and (3) provide astablefinancial framework thatfacilitates financial
intermediationandlending, bothdomesticallyandin theworldeconomy.
There is considerable doubt now whether the objective of price-level
stability was well served by the gold standard. There is evidence of
short-term price variability substantially in excess ofpost-World War II
experience. It may also be argued that long-term stability was, to a large
extent, accidental-a consequence of fortuitous gold discoveries rather
than the systematic operation of the system. But even with these qual-
ifications there can be little question that the gold standard was a system
thatutterlyexcludedtheextreme monetaryinstability Europewitnessed,
for example, in the 1920s. Thesystem also excluded the accelerating path
of inflation that we experienced in the 1970s from the interaction of
macroeconomic shocks, inertia, and accommodation.
But on a different account the gold standard was disappointing. Until
the principle "during crisis, discount freely" was firmly established, the
gold standard provided an exceedingly poor framework for financial
markets. The presence of a lender of last resort-whether it be the
Treasury or the central bank-is essential with fractional reserve bank-
ing. The lack ofa lender oflast resort was emphasized in the 1847 crisis
when the BankofEngland, in the midst ofa banking panic, soldconsols
and reduced discounts, thus assuring confidence in deposit convertibility
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Notes
1. Quoted in Andreades 1924, p. 340.
2. On the banking-and-currency-school controversy, see Mints 1945 and Viner 1937,
chap.5.
3. For the derivation see Friedman and Schwartz 1963. Throughout our discussion we
abstract from the existence of private banks, their note issue, their deposit liabilities, or
their demand for Bank of England notes.
4. The supply shock-a harvest failure----exerted opposing effects on prices and output
so that the net effect on nominal income and thereby on interest rates may in fact be
disregarded without obvious strain.
5. If a rise in the reserve-deposit ratio lowers the currency-deposit ratio so much as to
raise the money multiplier, in contrast with our assumption in equation (3), then a higher
reserve-deposit ratio would lower interest rates and thus change the specification in equa-
tion (4'). The iJ = 0 schedule might then be negatively sloped at low levels ofr, and so may
even the ; = 0 curve. We examine this case in section 5.5 below.
6. The defects ofthe Bank Actwere discused forcefully by ThomasTooke (1844) whose
views are analyzed by Laidler (1975). For a further analysis see Morgan 1943.
7. It is interesting to note that the developments during the October crisis were part of
the evidence that stimulated Jevons's theory of the "frequent autumnal pressure" (see
1evons 1884, chap. 5).
8. On 23 October, when London bankers held deposits of£1.6 million at the Bank of
England, the note reserves were only£1.5 million. Balancesofall bankers rose from £1.5 to
£2.1 million in theweekof16 October, buttheydeclined toonly£1.8 million by23 October.
9. While we could not trace the exact origin of this maxim, it was referred to by Lionel
Robbins in a memorandum submitted to the (Radcliffe) Committee on the Working ofthe
MonetarySystem (UnitedKingdom, Parliament 1960, p. 218). Robbinsascribes this maxim
to "apractical banker."We are indebtedto DavidLaidlerfor this reference. Itis interesting
to note that a similar statement can be found in Leaf1927, p. 34. There it is described as an
"old saying in the City." Leaf then goes on to say "but it takes time to bring it even from
Paris." We are indebted to Geoffrey Wood for this reference and to Anna1. Schwartz for
help in the search for the source of the popular maxim.
10. For some evidence, see Howarth 1974, p. 313.
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Comment J. R. T. Hughes
The papers by Dornbusch and Frenkel, Dutton, and Pippenger cover
partofthe more than nine decades (1821-1914) when Englandwas onthe
classical gold standard. The return to gold payments was threatened in
1825 and sequentiallyin 1835, 1836, 1837, and 1839. Former GovernorJ.
Horsley Palmer's defense ofthe BankofEngland's policy after 1836 and
criticism of that defense by Samuel Jones Loyd (later Lord Overstone)
led to the legislation of1844, the Bank ofEnglandAct-Peel'sBankAct
(see Palmer 1836; Loyd 1837a, 1837b; Horsefield 1953). That act essen-
tially putinto statuteform David Ricardo's posthumouslypublished Plan
for the Establishment of a National Bank (1824). Loyd had been the
major propagandist for the Ricardian solution-division of the Bank of
England into two parts, a Banking Department to do a strictly banking
business, like anycommercialbank, andanIssue Departmentto mechan-
ically exchange Bank of England notes for gold, and gold for Bank of
England notes at a fixed gold price.! This arrangement would produce a
convertible currency and, as other nations established fixed mint-par
valuesfor gold, an international regime offixed exchange rateswithin the
gold points would come into existence.
The Bank of England Act of 1844 remained mainly unchanged
2 for
seven decades until 1914 when it was "suspended" for the last time.
Leaving aside the period before 1844, the British monetarysystemwas to
be tested in threeverydifferenteconomicenvironments: (1) 1844-73, the
era Sir John Hicks once described as the "great Victorian boom" (and
which hosted the famous crises of 1847,1857, and 1866); (2) 1874-95, a
period ofpuzzling sluggishness in British monetary affairs in which there
was never any monetary strain of the sort that had once capped each
boom; and (3) 1896-1914, when prices and interest rates rose again.
The Bank of England, at the center of the gold standard system,
learned to live in these environments by trial and error. Before 1873 the
Bankwas relatively large, butwas surrounded by a huge, privatelyissued
moneystock (the inland bill system), a unit bankingsystem (429 "country
banks" in 1842, and still 167 banks by 1874), and an economy that
periodically expanded with force, straining the monetary system at the
seams (Coppieters 1955, pp. 158-59). Duringthelong compressionofthe
interest-rate structure in 1874-96 and stagnating prices, the economy
never boomed again; there was no strain on the financial system
(although when Barings threatened to suspendpaymentsin 1890 another
panicwas feared); and Bankpolicy became conservative to a remarkable
degree (Hughes 1968). After 1896 a plateau in gold reserves and an
J. R. T. Hughes is professor of economics at Northwestern University, Evanston,
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expanding economy resulted in the defensive Bank-policy stance noted
byPippenger. There really aretwo separatequestionsto answerhere: (1)
Howwell didtheBankofEnglandmanagethegoldstandardduringthese
three very different long-term financial climates? (2) How does the gold
standard system of 1844-1914 rate as an international financial system
compared to what followed it after World War I?
Frenkel and Dornbusch give us a close-up ofthe Bank during the first
great financial crisis under the Bank Act of 1844. Their paper explains
well the great surprise: Panic hoarding shifted from the earlier emphasis
on gold to an excess internal demand for gold's representative, the Bank
of England note. They correctly see that the Bank was playing its own
game in 1847, not Dutton's rules ofthe game. When gold flowed out, the
Bank had expanded its holdings of securities, replacing the gold with
notesin circulation andthus "financing" the gold outflow. Butthatpolicy
was probably an unintended outcome; the Bank's managers, as repre-
sentativesofa private, profit-makinginstitution, were competing aggres-
sively for business. They kept Bank rate below the market rate of dis-
count. As C. N. Ward-Perkins (1966, p. 264) put it in his classic paper a
century later:
The day afterthe Act became law, on5 September1844, the directors,
taking Sir Robert's advice to heart, announced a new rate and policy
for discounting, a minimum rate of 2V2 per cent being accepted for
first-class three-monthbills. Thiswas competitionindeed; marketrate,
though it had stood below 2 per cent, was tending to rise, and for the
next three years minimum bank rate was consistently lower than mar-
ket rate.
The policy objective was no higher than that, whatever the outcome.
The supply ofmoney is defined by Dornbusch and Frenkel, excluding
the circulation of private merchants' money-bills of exchange. We
wouldnotexclude themnowfrom ourvariousdefinitionsofmoney. They
would at least be part of M4. They circulated hand-to-hand as means of
payment in normal times (Ashton 1953), but in a crisis they fell to heavy
discounts as interest rates rose. They were dumped in part to avoid
capital losses (Hughes 1960, pp. 256-74). In volume the bills were much
larger than the BankofEngland's own circulation, andin the great crises
of1847, 1857, and 1866 it was their cascading deluge upon the banks and
discount houses that made the BankActof1844 an iron lid that laterhad
to be removed by the Treasury letter. William Newmarch's estimates
show that the average volume ofbills afloat, £54.89 million in the fourth
quarter of 1843, had risen by an astonishing 44 percent to £78.93 million
by the first quarter of 1847, while the Bank of England's own aggregate
circulation (in the public's hands and in the Banking Department's re-
serve) had remained nearly unchanged at just under £20 million (see267 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
Tookeand Newmarch 1857, pp. 589-92). Thecountrybankissue ofnotes
in 1847 was about £7 million, so a total liquidation ofthe private money
stockwouldputsome£87 million ofprivatemoneyagainst theBank's£20
million in Bank ofEngland notes. In addition, bank deposits totaled £55
million outside the Bank, and the Bank's own deposits were £15 million.
That made £157 million to be exchanged for Bank of England notes
totalling £20 million, without considering government debt, private
issues ofstocksandbonds, andotherforms ofcreditsellableoratcall (for
data see Coppieters 1955, pp. 149-60). The Bankunderthe act could not
normally increase its notes except through an inflow ofgold to the Bank.
The Bank's gold reserve had meanwhile fallen.
When panic came to a head in the autumn, the Bank's oft-denied role
as lender of last resort came into play-the Bank was expected by the
public and the government to be the banker for the entire nation. And
while theBankprofitedhandsomelyfrom its publicdutyto discount huge
amounts at high rates, the Bank was running out of its own notes even
while discounting. Inthe Treasuryletter, the chancellor andprimeminis-
ter intervened, authorizing the Bank to trade securities to the Issue
Department for fiduciary notes (to be used for loans only at the highest
discount rates). At the same time they promised a bill of indemnity
intendedto get bankofficials offthe hookfor theirviolations ofthe Bank
Act fiduciary-issue restrictions.
While it is true, as Frenkel and Dornbusch emphasize, that Sir Francis
Baring and others were shocked that the Banking Department's reserve
ofnotes could be exhaustedwhile the Issue Department'sreserve ofgold
held at high levels, the situation was of no surprise or disappointment to
Lord Overstone. He believed that credit cycles were inevitable, that the
Bank Act protected convertibility, and that the financial massacre cre-
ated by the dwindling reserve of the Banking Department was a neces-
sity. Overstone'sonlyobjectionwas the Bank'sperceptionthatithadany
public duties at all, that it had attempted to mitigate the crisis. To
Overstone the origin of financial trouble was no concern of the Bank's
directors. When asked by the Lords' Committee of 1848 ([1848] 1857,
question 1376) aboutthis: "Youconsiderthat in its BankingDepartment
the Bank should conduct its Banking Business in the same way whether
the drain is for foreign or internal purposes?" Overstone replied, "I
apprehendthatthe BankingDepartmentshould notlookto the causes of
a Drain ofBullion, but simply look to the State ofthe Banking reserve."
If disaster came, so be it. He was asked: "If the causes which naturally
and necessarily produce changes [contractions] are actually in operation
it is not desirable by any artificial means to endeavor to prevent those
violent results. In fact, the patient, however painful the operation may
be, must submit to it, if it becomes necessary?" (questions 1395-96).
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all the way. Writing in 1857, a decade later, as Mercator in the Times,
Overstone stated his principles about money supplies (quoted in Hughes
1960, p. 231) thus:
The great laws which determine the monetary equilibrium of the
commercialworld assign to thiscountryacertainamountofmoney. No
internal arrangements to which we may resort can alter orsuspend the
law ... the monetary arrangements ofthis, as ofevery othercountry,
must be sub-ordinate to the great principles which regulate the mone-
tary equilibrium of the world. Any attempt to resist or modify the
result of these principles can result only in confusion and embarrass-
ment.
Overstone was not one for pusillanimous countercyclical monetary poli-
cies.
When in 1857 a similar sequence of events occurred-a downturn in
the real economyfollowed by mounting financial panicand another huge
liquidation of the bill system-history repeated itself, only this time the
Banking Department reserve went bone dry and the Treasury letter
relieved the markets of a drought of Bank of England notes (Hughes
1967). Theeffectwas not"magical" (Ward-Perkins 1966, p. 266) as it had
been in 1847, but the currency remained convertible and economic
recoverycamequicklyenough. Asin 1847 the IssueDepartment'sbullion
hoard held up nicely while the Banking Department scraped bottom and
then went through the floor (Hughes 1960, app. 5).
One more great crisis with application of the Treasury letter came in
1866 and then the old-time experience of the Bank under the 1844 Act
became irrelevant. In 1873 the British financial crisis was not severe as it
was in the United States. The British financial system had already been
purged by the crash of Overend and Gurney in 1866. With the British
economy facing two decades ofmainly falling prices, the Bank followed
market interest rates downward, but now kept Bank rate above them
(Hughes 1968). Stung by the criticism it had earlier faced for putting
Bank rate below market rate in 1844--47, the Bank resolutely kept its
reserves high, its discounts low, and achieved the high reserve ratios
noted by Pippenger. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 514) would com-
ment on a similar policy pursued by the Federal Reserve system in the
1930s that did or did not contribute to stagnation, depending upon how
one views Wicksell's monetary theory (see Hicks 1977, chap 3). To some
extent, as Dutton notes, the Bank continued to expand its loans in times
of gold outflows, thus sterilizing the gold-outflow consequences on the
money supply.
When recovery came with the Alaskan and South African gold dis-
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policies and the British investorwent on a bingeofforeign acquisitions-
he had now become the aging rentier noted by Brinley Thomas. By 1913
morethan80 percentofthe newissues in the CityofLondonwereforeign
(Thomas 1954, pp. 228-30). The BankofEngland, now much reducedin
size relative to the great (now) amalgamated banks of London, acted
defensively to maintain the center of the old financial system until the
Germans marched in 1914. Although the Bank continued to maintain a
restraining hold on the money market by keeping its Bankrate above the
market rate (King 1936, chap. 9), without any return to the old booming
economyofthe earlier nineteenth century the Bank's quantitative weak-
ness was never tested.
The second factor suggested by the work ofFrenkel and Dornbusch is
worth additional comment. The technique of "crisis management"
worked out in 1847 was applied again in 1857 and, routinely, in 1866.
Originally the Bank of England itself had suggested that suchan escape
hatch be put into the 1844 Bank Act. But Peel left it out of the final
legislation (Horsefield 1953, pp. 110-11). Once the London financial
world realized that a Treasury letter could always be counted on to be
forthcoming, the Bank's crisis-proven management technique conceiv-
ably added long-term stability to expectations and thus to the gold
standard itself. Conceivably. Many writers, besides Bagehot, urged the
Banktoengagein countercyclicaloperations. Duttonfinds somenotvery
strong evidence thatthe Bankfollowed such advice, orat leastits actions
madeit appearso. Thefact is thatfrom 1866 to 1914 thesystemwas never
tested again. The stability ofthe gold standard in England may well have
been due to the failure of the economy to boom again before World
War I.
The Bank had lived for seven decades under the 1844 Act and the
world had lived that long under the gold standard centeredon the Bank.
The experience ofthe Bankin those years, apartfrom its policyofselling
government securities during panics to raise cash, evolved into our main
notions aboutcentralbanking. Thecurrencyhadremainedconvertible at
the center, at the Bank of England. Was the gold standard, thus man-
aged, a good international financial system? It did not generate long
periods ofinflation. The periods ofstagnation were followed by periods
of growth. There was vast worldwide economic growth based upon free
capital movement as well as the dynamic influences of England's free
trade policies. To say such achievements were unimpressive implies that
anexampleofa superiorsystem can befound. Perhapsit was theBretton
Woodssystem in the two decades before it drowned in dollars. However,
Nixon's speech of15 August 1971 was an internationalTreasury letter in
reverse, and there was no commitment ever again to redeem dollars for
gold. The United States needed no bill of indemnity from anyone.270 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
Notes
1. Page 1ofRicardo's pamphlet reads: "The Bank ofEngland performs two operations
ofBanking ... it issues a papercurrency as a substitute for a metallic one; and it advances
money in the way ofloan to merchants and others.... That these two operations have no
necessary connection, will appear obvious from this, that they might be carried on by two
separate bodies, without the slightest loss of advantage, either to the country or to the
merchants who receive accommodation from such loans."
2. Therewas no changein theActof1844 apartfrom periodicexpansionsofthefiduciary
issue as country banks gave up their issuing rights over time. There had been 6361icensed
issuers of private money as late as 1832. The last private issuer was taken over by Lloyd's
Bank in 1921 (see Coppieters 1955, p. 159; Feavearyear 1963, p. 321).
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General Discussion
MCCAULEY noted the authors' suggestion that the suspension ofPeel's
Act was a good thing. He asked them to elaborate on how behavior after
the crisis was affected by the suspension.
MCCLOSKEY commented on the rapidity ofthe economy's adjustment
to thecrisis. Ifacrisis ofconfidence ora harvest-inducedfinancial crisis of
this magnitude could be resolved within a month, as Dornbusch and
Frenkel suggest in their paper, then why be concerned about the adjust-
ment mechanism under the gold standard? Ifthe adjustment takes place
so fast, it may be worthwhile to make the simplifying assumption that
interest rates were exogenous to the British economy.
DORNBUSCH restated the aims of the Dornbusch-Frenkel paper. The
authors' objective was to look at a particular year in which the gold
standard was in operation and to ask how the system responded to
shocks. The shocks in question were not reckless creditexpansion, which
was impossible underPeel's Act; rather, in this instance, the disturbance
eminated from the real side. Under Peel's Act, there was a presumption
that when an external bullion drain took place, domestic currency in the
hands of the public would decline as well. An adjustment would be
facilitated. In this episode, however, the Banking Department of the
Bank of England initially offset the attempt by individuals to run down
theircash balances. Thereforenoadjustmenttook-place until theBankof
Englanddecidedthatit was no longerfeasible tocontinue tointervene, at
which time the Bank liquidated its consol portfolio. In a single day it
lowered the price ofconsols, orraised the discount rate, by four hundred
basis points. A lot offirms went bankruptthat day. TheBankjustified its272 Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel
action by stating that its primary responsibility was to maintain the
integrity ofits note issue-a comment on the Bank ofEngland's percep-
tion ofwhat it meantto act in the public interest. Atthis time, the Bank's
sole responsibility was to protect convertibility ofits notes; if the Bank's
initiatives created fears of mills being closed or riots in the streets, that
was the government's problem. The Bank of England did not think of
itself as engaged in countercyclical monetary policy; its interest was to
make profits. Whenever there was the risk ofan internal run, its concern
was to have enough consols to be able to go to the stock market and
liquidate them.
Dornbusch again restated the paper's conclusion: During the crisis of
1847, the Bank ofEngland did not act as a lender-of-Iast-resort; in fact it
did exactly the opposite. When bankruptcies were spreading because of
an internal shortage ofnotes, the Bank ofEngland went into the market
and bought notes, selling consols from its portfolio. Its actions were
exactly the opposite of those required of a lender-of-Iast-resort.
In response to McCloskey, Dornbusch suggested that adjustment was
so rapid because the interest-rate increase forced upon the market by the
Bank of England was so extreme. For twenty-five years the highest
interest rate observed had been 6 percent. Suddenly the interest rate was
driven up to 10 percent, and a large numberofbanks failed. Adjustment
was rapid, but there is no presumption that this was a good way of
managing monetary affairs.
Dornbusch elaborated upon what he meant when he stated that the
gold standard was working badly: he meant relative to the post-1847
period when there was an understanding that in response. to an internal
drain, the BankofEngland would discount freely. Ifthe gold standard is
understood to be a regime under which notes can be issued on the
strength of gold, then the pre-1847 system worked poorly. The Bank of
England certainly wished to avoid the possibility of a reckless credit
expansion and wished to contract credit whenever bullion was lost; but
any time the exchanges were favorable and a crisis occurred, it was
expected that the Bank should print money freely. Thus the lesson from
the 1847 episode is the distinction between internal- and external-
convertibility difficulties.
GOODHART raised a question about the October crisis. In his opinion,
the April crisis was explained perfectly in the paper. The analysis ofwhat
happenedwhen the 1844 Actwas relaxed raises no unresolved problems.
But in Goodhart's view, Dornbusch and Frenkel fail to adequately ex-
plain the October crisis. In April a crisis occurs, Bank rate is raised, gold
starts flowing in, and there is a recovery of confidence. Yet later the
authors write: "During the late summer and especially in early fall,
conditions deteriorated, setting the basis for the October crisis."273 The Bank of England in the Crisis of 1847
Goodhart wondered whether the authors had an explanation for the
October crisis.
DORNBUSCH explained the October crisis as the culmination of six
months of gold outflows to pay for imported grains. The decline in the
Bank's reserve ratio led the public to question whether the Bank could
recover from the loss of its reserves.
WHITE noted the authors' argument that the crisis of 1847 was a real
crisis in the sense that the immediate factor precipitating it was a harvest
failure. Atthe time, however, some individuals interpretedthe eventas a
delayed reaction to the overissuance ofbanknotes startingin 1844, when
the BankingDepartmentofthe BankofEnglandwas freed topursue any
policy it desired. White wondered if Dornbusch and Frenkel had consid-
ered those arguments andwhethertheyfound evidence to supportthem.
In response, FRENKEL referred to a quote from John Stuart Mill, who
describes the crisis of1847 as a completelyexogenous harvest failure that
differed fundamentally from prior financial crises.
MCCLOSKEY returnedto the questionofthe economy'sspeedofadjust-
ment. He noted that there were two possible interpretations ofthe 1847
episode. Either the economy was tremendously agile or the Bank of
England was tremendously agile. Either the elasticities that facilitate the
adjustment were very high or the violence with which the policy instru-
ments moved was very great. On the basis of the evidence presented in
the paper, it is not clear which is true.PART
III. International
Experience in the
Operation of the
Gold Standard